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I.

INTRODUCTION

In the recent Doe 169 v. Brandon decision, the Minnesota
Supreme Court held that a church licensing body did not owe a
duty to protect a minor from the intentional, tortious conduct of a
1
third party. The court found that the licensing body’s renewal of
the third party’s ministerial credentials did not create a foreseeable
risk that the third party would sexually molest the appellant; thus,
the licensing body had no duty to protect the minor from the third
2
party. Because the existence of duty is a threshold element, the
3
injured party’s negligence claim necessarily failed.
As Doe 169 traversed the legal system, the 2011 Domagala v.
4
Rolland decision proved crucial. In Domagala, the Minnesota
Supreme Court clarified that, though true only in limited and
narrow circumstances, it is possible for one actor to owe a duty of
care to another actor absent a special relationship between the
1.
2.
3.
4.

Doe 169 v. Brandon (Doe 169 II), 845 N.W.2d 174, 179 (Minn. 2014).
Id.
Id. at 177, 179.
805 N.W.2d 14 (Minn. 2011).
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5

parties. In Doe 169, it was undisputed that no special relationship
6
existed between the church licensing body and the injured party.
The Domagala exception, therefore, became the linchpin upon
which the Doe 169 decision would ultimately turn.
The exception outlined in Domagala may prove outcome
7
determinative; however, application of this exception necessitates
8
scrupulous judicial examination. The critical eye will note that the
Domagala exception is rife with highly subjective threshold issues.
Under Domagala, the element of duty only exists when the injury in
question is both (1) foreseeable, and (2) a direct result of an
9
actor’s own conduct. Each of these threshold issues—duty,
10
foreseeability, and misfeasance—are notoriously difficult to apply.
The critical eye will also note that the Minnesota Supreme
Court’s treatment of Doe 169 did not include the precise,
painstaking examination integral to a correct application of the
11
Domagala exception. In Doe 169, the court reiterated that the
absence of a special relationship between the church licensing
12
body and the injured party was not decisive. The court then found
that the licensing body was not, as a matter of law, liable for the
injury, as the licensing body’s actions did not meet the
13
considerable requirements of the Domagala exception. While this
decision falls in line with precedent—Minnesota has been notably
reluctant to hold third parties liable for involvement in sexual
5. Id. at 26 (“[W]hen a person acts in some manner that creates a
foreseeable risk of injury to another, the actor is charged with an affirmative duty
to exercise reasonable care to prevent his conduct from harming others.”).
6. Doe 169 II, 845 N.W.2d at 178.
7. See infra Part VI.E.
8. See infra Parts V.B, VI.C–D.
9. See infra Part III.B.2.
10. See John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Moral of MacPherson,
146 U. PA. L. REV. 1733, 1770 (1998), for a discussion of the ways in which the
element of duty “is a largely question-begging concept that can be safely used if
one is not misled by it.” See also infra Part V.B–C for a discussion of the legal
system’s wary approach to the misfeasance/nonfeasance distinction, and infra Part
VI.C for common criticisms of the foreseeability element.
11. See infra Parts V.A, C.2; VI.A, E.
12. Doe 169 II, 845 N.W.2d 174, 178 (Minn. 2014) (“In Domagala, we
explained that a duty of care to protect others can arise in two ‘instances.’”
(quoting Domagala v. Rolland, 805 N.W.2d 14, 22–23 (Minn. 2011))).
13. Id. at 179 (“Applying our case law to the facts and circumstances of this
particular case, we hold that the District Council did not create a foreseeable risk
of injury to Doe, and thus the District Council did not owe Doe a duty of care.”).
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14

abuse claims —the court’s rationale suggests a muddled
15
understanding of the Domagala exception. The court attributes its
Doe 169 decision to a purported, but largely unsupported, absence
16
of foreseeability. This attribution is erroneous. Contrary to the
17
court’s stated rationale, it is the passive nature of the defendant’s
18
conduct—the absence of misfeasance—that proves dispositive.
Understanding the complexities of the duty element is crucial
to understanding the blurred rationale behind the Doe 169
decision. To that end, this note begins with a brief historical
overview, outlining the development and evolution of the scope of
19
duty within the tort of negligence and examining this scope of
20
duty within the state of Minnesota specifically. Next, this note
21
presents the facts and procedural posture of the Doe 169 decision,
followed by an examination of the legal issues—the
22
misfeasance/nonfeasance distinction
and the foreseeability
23
element —that render the decision something of a conundrum.
Finally, this note explores the questions left unanswered by the Doe
24
169 decision and the troubling policy implications of the court’s
25
decision to reinstate a summary judgment.
14. See Jonathan J. Hegre, Minnesota “Nice”? Minnesota Mean: The Minnesota
Supreme Court’s Refusal to Protect Sexually Abused Children in H.B. ex rel. Clarke v.
Whittemore, 15 LAW & INEQ. 435, 458 (1997) (“By failing to appreciate the unique
nature and social significance of child sexual abuse, the supreme court’s ruling
severely limits victims’ collective ability to compel abuse reporting. Until such time
as [the Minnesota Supreme Court’s] test for special relationships in cases of child
sexual abuse reporting is properly modified, Minnesota children will continue to
suffer unnecessarily from the primary and secondary effects of sexual abuse.”).
15. See infra Part VI.E.
16. Doe 169 II, 845 N.W.2d at 179 (“[T]he [defendant] did not create a
foreseeable risk of injury to a foreseeable plaintiff. Thus, as a matter of law, the
[defendant] had no duty to [the plaintiff].” (emphasis added)).
17. Id. at 179 n.3 (“Because we decide the issue of duty on foreseeability, we
need not decide whether what the District Council did or did not do after . . .
constituted misfeasance or nonfeasance.”).
18. See id. at 179 for the “[s]everal undisputed facts” that support the court’s
conclusion. See infra Part V.A for a discussion of those factors the court considers
crucial.
19. See infra Part II.
20. See infra Part III.
21. See infra Part IV.
22. See infra Part V.B–C.
23. See infra Parts VI–VII.
24. See infra Parts VI.E, VII.
25. See infra Part VIII.
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II. THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE SCOPE OF DUTY
A.

The Element of Duty

As one legal scholar notes, with perhaps a hint of derision,
“Any first year law student can recite [the rule that] liability in tort
requires that the defendant have a duty to the plaintiff and that the
26
plaintiff’s harm result from a breach of that duty.” Specifically, to
sustain a prima facie claim of negligence, a plaintiff must prove
four elements: (1) existence of a duty of care, (2) breach of that
27
duty, (3) resultant injury, and (4) proximate causation.
It is the distinction between misfeasance and nonfeasance that
determines whether a duty attaches to an actor’s conduct.
Misfeasance is “‘active misconduct working positive injury to
28
others.’” Nonfeasance, meanwhile, is “‘passive inaction or a failure
29
to take steps to protect [others] from harm.’” There exists a
general obligation to avoid affirmative actions that pose a likely risk
of harm, but “[i]naction by a defendant—such as a failure to
warn—constitutes negligence only when the defendant has a duty
30
to act for the protection of others.”
B.

Duty and Negligence Emerge

Duty, the distinct obligation “to conform to the legal standard
31
of reasonable conduct in light of the apparent risk,” made its
26. John M. Adler, Relying Upon the Reasonableness of Strangers: Some
Observations About the Current State of Common Law Affirmative Duties to Aid or Protect
Others, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 867, 872 (1991).
27. Bjerke v. Johnson, 742 N.W.2d 660, 664 (Minn. 2007).
28. Doe 169 II, 845 N.W.2d 174, 178 (Minn. 2014) (quoting W. PAGE KEETON
ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 56 (5th ed. 1984)); see also ALLAN BEEVER,
REDISCOVERING THE LAW OF NEGLIGENCE 211 (2007) (suggesting that defining the
distinction as being that between “the causing of injury” and “the failure to benefit
. . . or . . . the failure to prevent harm” is “more helpful”).
29. Doe 169 II, 845 N.W.2d at 178 (quoting KEETON ET AL., supra note 28,
§ 56).
30. Domagala v. Rolland, 805 N.W.2d 14, 23 (Minn. 2011) (citing Ruberg v.
Skelly Oil Co., 297 N.W.2d 746, 750 (Minn. 1980)); see also FRANCIS H. BOHLEN,
STUDIES IN THE LAW OF TORTS 45 (1926) (“[W]hile everyone is bound to refrain
from action probably injurious to others, no duty to take affirmative precautions
for the protection of those voluntarily placing themselves in contact with him is
cast upon anyone . . . .”).
31. Peter F. Lake, Common Law Duty in Negligence Law: The Recent Consolidation
of a Consensus on the Expansion of the Analysis of Duty and the New Conservative Liability

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2015

5

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 41, Iss. 1 [2015], Art. 13

370

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41:1

32

debut at the end of the eighteenth century. The development of a
defined duty standard occurred almost concurrently with the
33
emergence of torts as a defined legal field. These legal evolutions
transpired amidst the chaos of the Industrial Revolution. As law
professor G. Edward White writes, “A standard explanation for the
emergence of an independent identity for [t]orts . . . is the affinity
of tort doctrines . . . to the problems produced by
34
The inventions and innovations of the
industrialization.”
Industrial Revolution—namely, industrial worksites, mass-produced
products, railroads, and motor vehicles—“had a marvelous,
35
unprecedented capacity for smashing the human body.”
Unsurprisingly, torts evolved as a cohesive legal mechanism
designed to provide remedies for the “unprecedented spate of
accidental deaths and injuries” that came as a grievous
36
disadvantage to the rise of modern industry.
Limiting Use of Policy Considerations, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1503, 1520–22 (1997)
(citing WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS 166 (2d ed. 1955))
(explaining that “duty” has been used by courts to mean: (1) negligence liability,
(2) general standard of conduct, (3) negligent conduct, and (4) the first element
of a prima facie negligence case, and further explaining that “‘[d]uty’ as the word
has been used by courts in this century has had several meanings”).
32. See Jean Elting Rowe & Theodore Silver, The Jurisprudence of Action and
Inaction in the Law of Tort: Solving the Puzzle of Nonfeasance and Misfeasance from the
Fifteenth Through the Twentieth Centuries, 33 DUQ. L. REV. 807, 832–33 (1995)
(“Somewhere in [the court’s] mind . . . there lurked the notion that defendant
was under a duty not to have behaved as the plaintiff claimed he did. [However,]
[a]s the eighteenth century gave way to the nineteenth, the word negligence
assumed legal significance . . . . Toward the mid-nineteenth century, the word
‘duty’ sounded its first cries.”); cf. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN
LAW 350 (3d ed. 2005) (noting that torts was “built up out of old bricks from the
common-law brickyard” and that many basic tort doctrines pre-dated the
emergence of torts as a distinct legal field, certainly including the concept of duty
and moral obligations).
33. See Rowe & Silver, supra note 32, at 827–28. (explaining that modern
negligence, and, thus, the modern concept of duty, “was born in the early
nineteenth century”).
34. G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 3
(1980) (“The process by which Torts emerged as a discrete branch of law was
more complex . . . and less dictated by the demands of industrial enterprise than
the standard account suggests. . . . [T]his new increase in cases . . . would not have
been sufficient had it not come at a time when legal scholars were prepared to
question and discard old bases of legal classification.”).
35. FRIEDMAN, supra note 32, at 350.
36. JOHN C.P. GOLDBERG & BENJAMIN C. ZIPURSKY, THE OXFORD
INTRODUCTIONS TO U.S. LAW: TORTS 15 (2010).
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Duty’s Originally Limited Scope

Today, the “notion of reasonably foreseeable victims . . . is . . .
a standard doctrinal test for determining to whom a duty of care is
37
owed.” The concept that “any person who engages in a course of
conduct . . . owes a duty to exercise due care against physically
harming anyone whom he might reasonably foresee physically
harming were he to perform that conduct carelessly” may seem
38
“intuitive.” This idea, however, has not always been viewed as
rational and instinctual.
In the early days of modern negligence law, scope of duty was
39
narrowly defined. Originally, an actor was negligent only if he,
40
she, or it failed to perform a specific duty. An obligation to
41
perform a specific duty could be prescribed in three ways : (1)
42
43
common law, (2) contract, or (3) statute. In the absence of a
preexisting duty, however, “[m]ere carelessness, resulting in harm
44
to another person, [was] not actionable.”
1.

Scope of Duty and Industrialization

This originally narrow scope of duty is commonly attributed to
45
fears of economic ruin. “Industry . . . seemed to be the foundation

37. Id. at 78.
38. Id. (emphasis omitted).
39. See id. (discussing the movement away from the “older, narrower duty
rules”).
40. WHITE, supra note 34, at 15.
41. See, e.g., WILLIAM B. HALE, HALE ON TORTS 454 (St. Paul, Minn., West
Publishing Co. 1896).
42. See id. at 468 (“All persons contracting to do certain things owe a duty not
to injure the person or property of another while in the performance of the
contract.”).
43. See id. at 476 (“The statute or ordinance may create, not only a public
duty, but a duty to private persons, a breach of which may be actionable
negligence; and yet an individual may not be able to recover, because he is not of
the class of persons for whose benefit the statute was designed.”).
44. Id. at 454.
45. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 32, at 350–51. But see Gary T. Schwartz, Tort Law
and the Economy in Nineteenth-Century America: A Reinterpretation, 90 YALE L.J. 1717,
1721 (1981) (arguing that this theory is “rudimentary” and illustrative of “rather
little about the actual common-law objectives” behind the emergence of torts).
Schwartz contends that the economic limiting theory is not supported by
contemporary case law, and that, in fact, “nineteenth-century tort law tended to be
generous in affirming the tort liabilities of emerging industry.” Gary T. Schwartz,
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on which economic growth, national wealth, and the greater good
46
of society rested; and thus industry had to be protected . . . .” It
was feared that “a duty of care grounded in foreseeability was too
47
expansive” and would impair manufacturers of mass-marketed
products by exposing them to a seemingly endless pool of potential
48
tort victims—customers and employees.
2.

Winterbottom v. Wright: An Illustrative Case

The old English case of Winterbottom v. Wright proves illustrative
49
of these early limitations. The mid-nineteenth century products
liability action, which “found general acceptance . . . in the United
50
51
States,” established the “privity of contract” rule. Pursuant to
Winterbottom’s holding, “a contractor, manufacturer, or vendor
[was] not liable for injury to third persons who [had] no
contractual relations with [that contractor, manufacturer, or
52
vendor.]”
In Winterbottom, the plaintiff-driver was injured while operating
53
a mail coach. The driver sued the manufacturer, claiming that the
54
mail coach was defective. The court held that even if the
manufacturer had negligently constructed and maintained the
55
coach, the manufacturer could not be held liable to the driver.
The manufacturer had contracted only with the driver’s employer,
and not with the driver himself. Perhaps in response to concern
that expanding tort liability would impede manufacturers, and
56
consequently the economy, the court declared that “[u]nless we
The Character of Early American Tort Law, 36 UCLA L. REV. 641, 641 (1989).
46. FRIEDMAN, supra note 32, at 350–51.
47. GOLDBERG & ZIPURSKY, supra note 36, at 79.
48. See id.
49. Winterbottom v. Wright, [Leading Decisions] Online Prod. Liab. Rep.
(CCH) ¶ 451 (Exch. June 6, 1842), available at 1842 WL 7800.
50. Id.
51. See e.g., GOLDBERG & ZIPURSKY, supra note 36, at 79.
52. Winterbottom, [Leading Decisions] Online Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 451.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. But see BEEVER, supra note 28, at 117–18 (2007), for a contrary view of
Winterbottom’s holding. Beever argues that, despite the wide acceptance of the view
that Winterbottom’s holding is attributable to fear of impeding industrialization, the
holding actually was based on (1) “the belief that the law of tort has no room to
operate when the claimant’s injury was caused by an event covered by contract,”
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confine the operation of such contracts as this to the parties who
entered into them, the most absurd and outrageous consequences,
57
to which [we] can see no limit, would ensue.”
3.

From Wagons to Automobiles: Expansion of Duty

The scope of duty was broadened and further defined in an
early twentieth-century opinion, when Justice Benjamin Cardozo,
58
“wielding a mighty axe . . . buried the general [privity] rule.” In
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., Cardozo underscored that “a duty of
care and vigilance” extends beyond those with whom one chooses
59
to contract. Rather than “something one chooses to accept” by
establishing a contractual relationship, a duty of care “is imposed
60
by law for the protection of potential victims.” In MacPherson, the
plaintiff purchased an automobile from Buick Motor Co. with a
61
defective wheel that “crumbled.” Buick Motor Co. was a
manufacturer of automobiles, but did not manufacture the
62
defective wheel. Nevertheless, Cardozo, in a departure from the
contemporary notion of accountability, found that the company
63
should reimburse MacPherson. Cardozo wrote:
If [an actor] is negligent, where danger is to be foreseen,
a liability will follow. . . . We have put aside the notion that
the duty to safeguard life and limb, when the
consequences of negligence may be foreseen, grows out of
contract and nothing else. We have put the source of the
obligation where it ought to be. We have put its source in
64
the law.
With this landmark decision, Justice Cardozo paved the way for
the current understanding of scope of duty. “The negligence
principle . . . was not tied to status or vocation or contract, but was

and (2) “the fear of indeterminate liability.” Id. at 118.
57. Winterbottom, [Leading Decisions] Online Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 451.
58. Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 10, at 1736 (quoting William L. Prosser,
The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1100
(1960)).
59. 217 N.Y. 382, 385 (1916).
60. GOLDBERG & ZIPURSKY, supra note 36, at 80.
61. 217 N.Y. at 384–85.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 390–91.
64. Id. at 390.
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65

a reflection of generalized civil obligations.” Though MacPherson
66
centered on negligence tied to supplied goods, the opinion had
the larger impact of “extract[ing] negligence from a relational
67
context . . . and identif[ying] it with a universal duty of care.”
III. SCOPE OF DUTY IN MINNESOTA
A.

Limitations on Duty: Not Our Brother’s Keeper

Though the scope of duty has expanded significantly, this
expansion has not continued boundlessly. As the Minnesota
Supreme Court has noted, “The public has an interest that no man
shall act so as to injure another, it has no concern that he shall
68
benefit anyone.” In Minnesota, “we are not our brother’s
69
keeper.” Ordinarily, “there is no duty to control the conduct of a
70
third person to prevent physical harm to another,” nor is there a
duty to protect another person from harm caused by a third
71
person.
The question of the limitation of the scope of duty has been
argued extensively. In general, Minnesota courts have found that
“the prevention of crime is essentially a governmental function”
72
and is not the responsibility of average citizens. Likewise, “a duty
to protect against the devious, sociopathic, and unpredictable
conduct of criminals does not lend itself easily to an ascertainable

65. WHITE, supra note 34, at 125.
66. See id.
67. Id. at 127.
68. BOHLEN, supra note 30, at 40, 294 (postulating that this limitation in
“[the] attitude of extreme individualism so typical of [A]nglo-[S]axon thought”
encourages individuals to act with self-reliance); cf. Robert Justin Lipkin,
Comment, Beyond Good Samaritans and Moral Monsters: An Individualistic Justification
of the General Legal Duty to Rescue, 31 UCLA L. REV. 252, 254–55 (1983) (recognizing
“a minimalist conception of the state, whose salient function is proscribing
harmful conduct, not a person’s failure to act morally” as responsible for the
limitation).
69. Lundgren v. Fultz, 354 N.W.2d 25, 27 (Minn. 1984).
70. Doe v. Brainerd Int’l Raceway, Inc., 533 N.W.2d 617, 621 (Minn. 1995)
(citing Harper v. Herman, 499 N.W.2d 472, 474 (Minn. 1993) and Lundgren, 354
N.W.2d at 27).
71. Domagala v. Rolland, 805 N.W.2d 14, 24 (Minn. 2011).
72. Erickson v. Curtis Inv. Co., 447 N.W.2d 165, 169 (Minn. 1989).
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standard of care uncorrupted by hindsight nor to a determination
73
of causation that avoids speculation.”
To this end, a trailer park manager is not required to
74
safeguard tenants’ children from a sexually abusive neighbor.
Friends are not obligated to keep a watchful eye on an intoxicated
75
acquaintance’s physical condition. A boat owner does not have to
76
warn an adult guest that the water is too shallow for safe diving.
B.

Exceptions to the General No Duty to Protect Rule

There are, however, two exceptions to this general rule. A duty
to protect from foreseeable harm arises when (1) a special
relationship exists between the parties, or (2) an actor’s own
77
conduct creates the risk.
To determine whether an injury was foreseeable, the
Minnesota Supreme Court has held that one must consider
“whether the specific danger was objectively reasonable to expect,
not simply whether it was within the realm of any conceivable
78
possibility.” The risk of foreseeable injury must be “clear to the
79
person of ordinary prudence.” If the connection between the
danger and the defendant’s own conduct is “too remote, . . . there
80
is no duty.”
1.

The Special Relationship Exception

An actor owes a duty of care if a “special relationship” exists
81
between the parties and the risk of injury is “foreseeable.”
Ordinarily, there is no duty to control the conduct of a
third person to prevent him from causing physical harm
to another unless a special relationship exists, either
73. Id.
74. Clark ex rel. H.B. v. Whittemore, 552 N.W.2d 705, 706 (Minn. 1996).
75. Gilbertson v. Leininger, 599 N.W.2d 127, 128 (Minn. 1999).
76. Harper v. Herman, 499 N.W.2d 472, 473 (Minn. 1993).
77. Domagala v. Rolland, 805 N.W.2d 14, 23 (Minn. 2011) (“A duty to act
with reasonable care for the protection of others arises in two instances implicated
in this case.”).
78. Whiteford ex rel. Whiteford v. Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A., 582 N.W.2d
916, 918 (Minn. 1998).
79. Connolly v. Nicollet Hotel, 254 Minn. 373, 382, 95 N.W.2d 657, 664
(1959).
80. Germann v. F.L. Smithe Mach. Co., 395 N.W.2d 922, 924 (Minn. 1986).
81. Bjerke v. Johnson, 742 N.W.2d 660, 667 (Minn. 2007).
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between the actor and the third person which imposes a
duty to control, or between the actor and the other which
82
gives the other the right to protection.
Three scenarios lead to the existence of a special
83
84
85
relationship : relational status, assumption of custody, and
86
assumption of responsibility.
2.

The Domagala Exception

Additionally, as Domagala clarifies, a duty of care arises when
“the defendant’s own conduct creates a foreseeable risk of injury to a
87
foreseeable plaintiff.” In the 2011 decision, Rolland, an experienced
skid load operator, agreed to help Domagala, who had no similar
88
experience, with landscaping work. Rolland controlled the skid
82. Delgado v. Lohmar, 289 N.W.2d 479, 483 (Minn. 1979) (citing Cracraft v.
City of St. Louis Park, 279 N.W.2d 801 (Minn. 1979)).
83. See Bjerke, 742 N.W.2d at 665 (“The first prerequisite to a finding of a duty
to protect another from harm is the existence of a special relationship between
the parties. A special relationship can be found to exist under any one of three
distinct scenarios.”).
84. See Erickson v. Curtis Inv. Co., 447 N.W.2d 165, 168 (Minn. 1989). A
special relationship may arise due to the status of the parties in relation to one
another. Id. For example, innkeepers owe a duty to guests, as do common carriers
to passengers, and landowners to invitees. Harper v. Herman, 499 N.W.2d 472, 474
(1993). These relationships present “a situation where B has in some way
entrusted his or her safety to A and A has accepted that entrustment.” Erickson, 447
N.W.2d at 168.
85. See Bjerke, 742 N.W.2d. at 665. An individual may assume, or may receive
by grant of law, custody of another person who is “‘deprived of normal
opportunities of self-protection.’” Id. (quoting Harper, 499 N.W.2d at 474 (Minn.
1993)). In Bjerke, for example, an adult “accepted entrustment” of a child and,
therefore, also accepted a duty to protect that child from the tortious actions of a
third party when that adult assumed a “large degree of control” over the child
visiting the adult’s home. Id.
86. Laska v. Anoka Cnty., 696 N.W.2d 133, 138 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005) (“‘A
special relationship may also arise where one accepts responsibility to protect
another, although there was no initial duty.’” (quoting Lundman v. McKown, 530
N.W.2d 807, 820 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995))). For example, “the supreme court
concluded a special relationship existed between a diabetic boy and two
individuals—a Christian Science nurse and a Christian Science practitioner—
whom his mother had hired, paid, and entrusted to provide care to him by praying
during his illness.” Id. (citing Lundman, 530 N.W.2d at 821–23).
87. Domagala v. Rolland, 805 N.W.2d 14, 23 (Minn. 2011) (emphasis
added).
88. Id. at 19.
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loader at all times. When rocks jammed the skid loader, Rolland
would “flutter the hydraulics” to free the debris, though he knew
89
that doing so was “very dangerous.” After “fluttering” the
machine’s bucket attachment to loosen a trapped stone, the bucket
90
detached and fell onto Domagala’s foot. As a result, Domagala
91
had three toes amputated.
There was no special relationship between Rolland and
92
Domagala; however, the Minnesota Supreme Court found that
93
this fact was not ultimately decisive. The court emphasized that
the duty imposed by the existence of a special relationship is
“separate and distinct” from the duty that one must act with
94
reasonable care. When an actor’s own conduct creates a risk of
harm, a duty of reasonable care is owed, regardless of relational
95
status. This distinction proved critical to the Doe 169 decision.
IV. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE OF DOE 169
A.

Facts

From 1991 to 1999, Paul Alan Brandon worked as a youth
pastor at the Maple Grove Assemblies of God Church (Maple
96
Grove). During this time, Greg Hickle worked at Maple Grove as a
97
senior pastor and acted as Brandon’s supervisor. In his youth
pastor position, Brandon had multiple job performance problems,
98
including “boundary issues” with youth group participants.
Hickle, acting in his supervisory role, “ordered Brandon to stop”
behaviors such as hosting sleepovers for the youth group
99
participants, which were viewed as cause for concern. Brandon

89. Id.
90. Id. at 19–20.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 20.
93. See id. at 30.
94. Id. at 23 (quoting Louis v. Louis, 636 N.W.2d 314, 320 (Minn. 2001)).
95. Id. at 23.
96. Doe 169 II, 845 N.W.2d 174, 176 (Minn. 2014).
97. Id.
98. Doe 169 v. Brandon (Doe 169 I), No. A12-1721, 2013 WL 2302023, at *2
(Minn. Ct. App. May 28, 2013), rev’d, 845 N.W.2d 174.
99. Doe 169 II, 845 N.W.2d at 176.
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was not, however, accused of acting in a sexually inappropriate
100
manner with any minors.
Due to his job performance and boundary issues, Brandon
101
resigned in 1999. As a condition of his separation from Maple
Grove, Brandon agreed to present a letter to prospective employers
102
detailing Maple Grove’s concerns.
Despite his resignation,
Brandon remained a credentialed member of the Assemblies of
103
God Church. The Minnesota District Council of the Assemblies
of God (District Council) recommended the renewal of Brandon’s
104
ministerial credentials.
As early as 1999, Brandon began volunteering as a youth
leader at Emmanuel Christian Center of the Assemblies of God,
105
Inc. (ECC). Brandon did not present ECC with the letter that
106
Maple Grove had composed. Crucially, Brandon’s ECC volunteer
107
youth leader position did not require ministerial credentials. As
such, “the District Council itself did not control or supervise”
108
Brandon in his ECC position.
In 2004, Hickle left Maple Grove and began working for the
109
District Council as secretary and treasurer. As Brandon’s former
supervisor, Hickle knew of, and, indeed, insisted that Brandon
cease those boundary issues exhibited by Brandon during his time
110
at Maple Grove. Nevertheless, in his District Council position,
“Hickle took no action relative to Brandon’s volunteer work at
111
ECC.”

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id.
Id.
Doe 169 I, 2013 WL 2302023, at *2.
Doe 169 II, 845 N.W.2d at 176.
Id.
Id.
Doe 169 I, 2013 WL 2302023, at *3.
Doe 169 II, 845 N.W.2d at 176.
Id. at 177.
Id. at 176.
Id.
Id. at 177.
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Procedural Posture
1.

The District Court Decision

John Doe 169 (Doe 169), a former ECC youth group
participant, accused Brandon of sexually molesting him while he
112
was at Brandon’s house for a sleepover. Subsequently, Doe 169
113
brought a negligence claim against the District Council. Doe 169
alleged that the District Council acted negligently when the District
Council recommended renewal of Brandon’s ministerial
114
credentials. The district court granted summary judgment in
favor of the District Council, finding that it owed no duty of care to
Doe 169, as the District Council and Doe 169 did not have a special
115
relationship. Subsequently, Doe 169 appealed the district court’s
decision, arguing that the district court’s conclusion that the
District Council owed him no duty of reasonable care was
116
erroneous.
2.

The Minnesota Court of Appeals Decision

The Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s
117
decision and remanded the case back to the lower court. The
appellate court found that the district court’s decision was based on
a misapplication of law—the absence of a special relationship
between the District Council and Doe 169 was not wholly
118
decisive. The District Council likely knew, through Hickle, of
Brandon’s past inappropriate conduct with minors and had general
119
knowledge of sexual abuse by ministers.
Subsequently, the
appellate court found that the foreseeability of Doe 169’s injury
120
necessitated jury consideration.
The District Council sought
review of the appellate court’s decision; a request which was
121
granted by the Minnesota Supreme Court.
112. Id. at 176.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Doe 169 I, No. A12-1721, 2013 WL 2302023, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. May 28,
2013), rev’d, 845 N.W.2d 174.
117. Id. at *9.
118. Id. at *6.
119. Id. at *7–8.
120. Id.
121. Doe 169 II, 845 N.W.2d 174, 177 (Minn. 2014).
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The Minnesota Supreme Court Decision

The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed the appellate court’s
122
holding and reinstated the district court’s summary judgment.
The supreme court held that, under Domagala, the District
Council’s recommendation of credential renewal did not create a
123
duty of care to Doe 169, as there was no foreseeable risk of harm.
The link between the District Council’s actions and Doe 169’s
injury, the court held, was simply “too attenuated” for Doe 169’s
124
injury to have been a foreseeable consequence.
V. ANALYSIS
A.

The Court’s Four Decisive Factors

The Minnesota Supreme Court based its decision in Doe 169
on four critical factors: (1) the District Council did not employ,
supervise, or control Brandon; (2) a separate volunteer application
process controlled Brandon’s acceptance as a volunteer; (3)
Brandon spent years volunteering for ECC before the District
Council came to know of Brandon’s past; and (4) the ECC, not the
District Council, controlled the determination of an applicant’s
125
fitness.
The court stated that these factors spoke to the
unforeseeable nature of Doe 169’s injury. Actually, however, these
factors centered on the control, or lack thereof, the District
Council exercised over Brandon.
If the Minnesota Supreme Court intended these factors to
illustrate that the District Council had little opportunity to know of
Brandon’s questionable behavior, and, therefore, could not have
realized the potential danger Brandon posed, then its intention
fails. The Minnesota Court of Appeals advanced a convincing
argument that, under the law of agency, Hickle’s knowledge of
Brandon’s inappropriate behavior was likely imputed to the District
126
Council. Interestingly, this contention was not addressed at all by
the supreme court.
122. Id. at 179.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. See Doe 169 I, No. A12-1721, 2013 WL 2302023, at *16 (Minn. Ct. App.
May 28, 2013) (arguing that Hickle likely acted as the District Council’s agent, as
an agency relationship “‘results from the manifestation of consent by one person

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol41/iss1/13

16

McDonald: Torts Law: Blurred Elements: The New Nebulous Nature of Foreseeab

2015]

DOE 169 V. BRANDON

381

The crux of the supreme court’s rationale was not
foreseeability; it was the distinction between misfeasance and
nonfeasance. The court stated that the issue of the District
127
Council’s potential misfeasance was not reached. Yet, the court
largely credited as the basis for its decision the fact that the District
Council did not exert control over Brandon securing, or operating
within, his volunteer position. The court did not examine the
question of whether the District Council had reason to know of
Brandon’s history. Previously, when the court has examined an
actor’s level of “control” over a situation, its examination has
128
culminated in a discussion of that actor’s level of misfeasance.
B.

The Difficult Distinction Between Misfeasance and Nonfeasance

At first blush, the misfeasance/nonfeasance distinction
appears straightforward. However, “in practice it is not always easy
129
to say whether an alleged misconduct is active or passive.”
Indeed, at times, attempts at distinction prove to be an exercise in
130
“profound confusion.” Categorizing complex human actions and
interactions “invites decision-making based on some fragile factual
131
characterizations.” Consider, for example, a situation in which a
gun stolen from an unalarmed shop is used as a murder weapon.
Clearly, the individual who pulled the trigger committed an

to another that the other shall act on his behalf and subject to his control, and
consent by the other to so act’” (quoting PMH Props. v. Nichols, 263 N.W.2d 799,
802 (Minn. 1978))), rev’d, 845 N.W.2d 174; see also id. at *17 (arguing that Hickle’s
knowledge was likely imputed to the District Council, as “‘[k]nowledge of an agent
acquired previous to the agency, but appearing to be actually present in his mind
during the agency, and while acting for his principal in the particular transaction
or matter, will, as respects such transactions or matter, be deemed notice to his
principal, and will bind him as fully as if originally acquired by him’” (quoting
Lebanon Sav. Bank v. Hallenbeck, 29 Minn. 322, 326, 13 N.W. 145, 147 (1882))).
127. Doe 169 II, 845 N.W.2d at 179 n.3.
128. See Lundgren v. Fultz, 354 N.W.2d 25, 28 (Minn. 1984) (arguing that a
psychiatrist’s ability, and subsequent failure, to control his patient created a risk of
harm); Olson v. Ische, 343 N.W.2d 284, 290 (Minn. 1984) (arguing that a
passenger was not in control of an automobile and, thus, was not liable for a
negligent accident caused by the driver).
129. BOHLEN, supra note 30, at 294.
130. See Rowe & Silver, supra note 32, at 808.
131. Adler, supra note 26, at 881.
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affirmative action, but what about the shop owner? One court may
well decide that the failure to stringently secure the shop was an
132
inactionable, passive choice; another court may decide that a
reasonable jury could find that the owner’s lapse in security
measures constituted affirmative conduct that facilitated the theft
133
and, in turn, the murder. The subjective quality inherent in this
distinction, when applied to concrete fact patterns, has the
134
potential to “wreak conceptual chaos.”
C.

The Distinction in Minnesota
1.

Judicial Reluctance

The Minnesota legal system has a long history of handling the
135
misfeasance/nonfeasance distinction warily. Over one hundred
years ago, in 1910, the Minnesota Supreme Court considered
136
Brower v. Northern Pacific Railway Co. In Brower, a railroad engineer
failed to correctly replace a gauge, and a worker was injured due to
137
this oversight. Though the court ultimately decided that the
138
the court
engineer’s actions constituted misfeasance,
acknowledged that “[t]he thinness and uncertainty of the
distinction between misfeasance, malfeasance, and nonfeasance
leaves an exceedingly unstable basis on which to rest an important

132. See Valentine v. On Target, Inc., 727 A.2d 947 (Md. 1999).
133. See Gallara v. Koskovich, 836 A.2d 840, 843 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
2003) (denying summary judgment to a gun store, as the court decided that a
reasonable jury could conclude that the gun store’s actions amounted to
affirmative, actionable negligence).
134. Rowe & Silver, supra note 32, at 808.
135. See Brower v. N. Pac. Ry. Co., 109 Minn. 385, 124 N.W. 10 (1910). For an
early twentieth century discussion of the difficulty of the misfeasance/nonfeasance
distinction in other courts as well, see Floyd R. Mechem, The Liability of an Agent to
Third Persons in Tort, 20 YALE L.J. 239, 252 (1911) (“The attempted distinction
between misfeasance and non-feasance has been very much criticized and often
denied to exist. It is undoubtedly true that the Latin names employed may not be
very appropriate or illuminating.”). But see BEEVER, supra note 28, at 205
(“‘[T]here is no distinction more deeply rooted in the common law and more
fundamental than that between misfeasance and nonfeasance.’” (quoting Francis
H. Bohlen, The Moral Duty to Aid Others as a Basis of Tort Liability, 56 U. PA. L. REV.
217, 219 (1908))).
136. 109 Minn. 385, 124 N.W. 10 (1910).
137. Id. at 386, 124 N.W. at 11.
138. Id. at 388, 124 N.W. at 11.
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139

principle of liability.” A century later, in Domagala, the Minnesota
Supreme Court demonstrated that this unstable foundation
remained a fount of concern, and noted “the confounding
complexity of characterizing a defendant’s action or inaction as
140
misfeasance or nonfeasance.”
2.

Judicial Reliance

Nevertheless, the misfeasance/nonfeasance distinction has
played a valid and critical role in negligence claims, at times serving
as a case-determinative element. For example, the Minnesota
141
Supreme Court’s decisions in Tholkes v. Decock and Giefer v.
142
showcase
the
manner
in
which
the
Dierckx
misfeasance/nonfeasance distinction can, rather than “wreak
143
144
conceptual chaos,” prove to be of “crucial importance.” Tholkes
and Giefer share broadly similar fact patterns. In both cases,
motorists were injured as a result of defective roadwork. In Tholkes,
145
a motorist sustained injuries after driving into an open culvert.
Highway repairmen were working to repair the culvert and left the
culvert exposed, unbarricaded, and “without guards, lights, or
146
other warnings.” In Giefer, a motorist sustained injuries after
147
driving into a bridge washout. There had been a torrential
rainfall, and township officers only managed to barricade one side
148
of the washout.
Despite these similarities, Tholkes and Giefer had divergent
outcomes. The issue of liability in Tholkes was a question for the
149
150
jury; the defendant in Giefer was excused from liability. These
disparate determinations turned on the misfeasance/nonfeasance
distinction. The defendant’s actions in Tholkes amounted to an

139. Id. (quoting EDWIN A. JAGGARD, 1 HAND-BOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 288
(St. Paul, Minn., West Publishing Co. 1895)).
140. Domagala v. Rolland, 805 N.W.2d 14, 22 (Minn. 2011).
141. 125 Minn. 507, 147 N.W. 648 (1914).
142. 230 Minn. 34, 40 N.W.2d 425 (1950).
143. Rowe & Silver, supra note 32, at 808.
144. BEEVER, supra note 28, at 205.
145. Tholkes, 125 Minn. at 508, 147 N.W. at 648.
146. Id.
147. Giefer, 230 Minn. at 35, 40 N.W.2d at 425.
148. Id.
149. Tholkes, 125 Minn. at 511–12, 147 N.W. at 649.
150. Giefer, 230 Minn. at 38, 40 N.W.2d at 427.
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151

“affirmative act of misconduct.” Conversely, the Giefer defendants’
failure “to do something more” than barricade one side of the
bridge washout was deemed nonfeasance and, thus, no liability
152
would be imposed as a matter of law.
As evidenced by Domagala, the misfeasance/nonfeasance
distinction maintains its relevancy. In fact, the Domagala court,
though cognizant of criticisms and complications, urged that the
distinction is, nonetheless, the conceptual foundation upon which
153
the element of duty is built. Outside of a special relationship, a
duty to protect emerges only when the defendant’s own conduct
gives rise to the risk of harm. That is, the misfeasance/nonfeasance
distinction is inextricably linked with a finding of an existent duty.
The court noted that “[t]he distinction between the specific duty to
warn and exercising reasonable care by giving a warning likely
stems from the historical divergence of liability for misfeasance and
154
nonfeasance.”
VI. THE FORESEEABILITY ISSUE
A.

Foreseeability in Doe 169

Domagala played an integral role in the judicial treatment of
155
Doe 169, and the misfeasance/nonfeasance distinction is integral
156
to Domagala. It is interesting, then, that the Minnesota Supreme
157
Court declined to consider this distinction in Doe 169. Instead,
the court chose to frame its decision around the element of
foreseeability, despite the fact that the element of foreseeability has
earned its own fair share of criticism, and, arguably, provides a basis
for decision that is less stable than the misfeasance/nonfeasance
151. Tholkes, 125 Minn. at 511–12, 147 N.W. at 649.
152. Giefer, 230 Minn. at 38, 40 N.W.2d at 427.
153. Domagala v. Rolland, 805 N.W.2d 14, 22 (Minn. 2011); see also Adler,
supra note 26, at 870 (characterizing the distinction as “judicial hair-splitting”). But
see Rowe & Silver, supra note 32, at 808 (“The law (if it has a will) never intended
that nonfeasance and misfeasance should be distinguished, since in logic inaction
is one form of action.”).
154. Domagala, 805 N.W.2d at 22.
155. See infra Part VI.E.
156. See supra Part V.C.2.
157. Doe 169 II, 845 N.W.2d 174, 179 n.3 (Minn. 2014) (“Because we decide
the issue of duty on foreseeability, we need not decide whether what the District
Council did or did not do after Hickle joined it constituted misfeasance or
nonfeasance.”).
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158

distinction.
Furthermore, in relying upon the foreseeability
element, the court ignored contradictory case law, including a
159
problematic dual standard presented in Domagala.
B.

Palsgraf and the Importance of Foreseeability

Foreseeability is “often cited as the most important factor in
duty,” and the use of foreseeability in deciding matters of
160
negligence is “nearly ubiquitous.” Another Cardozo opinion, the
infamous Palsgraf decision, exemplifies a situation in which the
161
foreseeability element played a critical and clear role. In Palsgraf,
the plaintiff was injured when a railway passenger’s fireworks,
carried in an unmarked package, exploded after falling onto the
162
tracks. The New York Court of Appeals held that the station
guards, who jostled the passenger when it appeared he was in
danger of toppling onto the tracks himself, were not liable for the
163
plaintiff’s injuries. Writing for the court, Cardozo explained that
the guards had no way of knowing that their actions held a
164
“potency of peril.” The guards had no reason to suspect that the
165
unmarked package contained fireworks. Nor could the guards
have reasonably predicted that their interaction with the passenger
would have any effect on the plaintiff, who stood “at the other end
166
of the platform many feet away.” The guards were not liable for
“inadvert[ently]” causing the plaintiffs injuries, as the plaintiff was
not in the “orbit of the danger as disclosed to the eye of reasonable
vigilance,” and, thus, was not within the guards’ “orbit of . . .
167
duty.”
Though Palsgraf was decided nearly a century ago, its lesson
endures. A defendant should not be liable for an injury that occurs
168
outside his, her, or its “range of reasonable apprehension.” The

158. See infra Parts VI.C–E, VII.
159. See infra Parts VI.E, VII.
160. W. Jonathan Cardi, The Hidden Legacy of Palsgraf: Modern Duty Law in
Microcosm, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1873, 1884 (2011).
161. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 99 (N.Y. 1928).
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 100–01.
168. Id. at 101.
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persistence of this lesson is exemplified by the abundance of
negligence cases that have foreseeability, or lack thereof, as a
169
dispositive factor. As the Doe 169 court’s analysis shows, however,
application of this familiar factor is not necessarily an easy or
170
straightforward exercise.
C.

The Problematic Nature of Foreseeability in General Negligence Law

Difficulties arise when, as is typical, the foreseeability of an
incident does not involve such clear-cut circumstances as are
present in Palsgraf. The element of foreseeability in general
negligence law has been described as “abstract, vague, and
171
imprecise.”
That which is “foreseeable” is based on what a
172
“reasonable person in [the] defendant’s position” would expect.
This standard is, by definition, inherently subjective and open to
interpretation, as “both the reasonable man and his foreseeability
are transparent fictions . . . . They are argumentative words with no
definite or literal meaning but are capable of absorbing any
173
meaning given them.”
For this reason, legal scholar William Prosser argued that
“[f]oreseeability of risk, in short, carries only an illusion of certainty
in defining the consequences for which the defendant will be
174
liable.” This illusion quickly begins to unravel upon comparisons
of discordant court decisions. As Prosser noted, one court may hold

169. See, e.g., Foss v. Kincade, 766 N.W.2d 317, 318 (Minn. 2009) (“[The]
homeowner did not have a duty to secure an empty bookcase to the wall to
prevent it from tipping over because it was not reasonably foreseeable that a threeyear-old guest would injure himself by attempting to climb the bookcase.”);
Whiteford ex rel. Whiteford v. Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A., 582 N.W.2d 916, 919
(Minn. 1998) (noting that the danger of a child colliding with a stationary
snowmobile was too remote a possibility to impose a duty on the snowmobile
manufacturer).
170. Doe 169 II, 845 N.W.2d 174 (Minn. 2014).
171. D.E. Buckner, Annotation, Foreseeability as an Element of Negligence and
Proximate Cause, 100 A.L.R.2d 942 (1965).
172. W. Jonathan Cardi, Purging Foreseeability: The New Vision of Duty and Judicial
Power in the Proposed Restatement (Third) of Torts, 58 VAND. L. REV. 739, 745 (2005)
(citation omitted).
173. Leon Green, Foreseeability in Negligence Law, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 1401, 1413
(1960) (“To attempt to draw the line between the foreseeable and the
unforeseeable in the world of everyday affairs raises even more difficulties than the
determination of where space leaves off and outerspace begins.”).
174. William L. Prosser, Palsgraf Revisited, 52 MICH. L. REV. 1, 19 (1953).
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that “the foreseeability of the spread of fire ends at the first
175
adjoining house,” while another court may deem foreseeable that
“a mudhole left by a defendant in a highway would stall a car, that a
rescuer attempting to tow it out would get his wooden leg stuck in
the mud, and that a loop in the tow rope would lasso his good leg
176
and break it.” Evidently, foreseeability is a fluid concept open to
subjective reasoning and perspective. Hence, in Doe 169, while the
Minnesota Court of Appeals proposed that the District Council’s
177
178
foreseeability was at issue, the supreme court found otherwise.
D.

Further Foreseeability Complications in Minnesota: The Domagala
Variance

The foreseeability standards set forth by Minnesota case law
share the inconsistent nature of broader foreseeability
179
definitions. A sharper clarification of foreseeability is further
impeded by recent developments in Minnesota’s negligence law.
Domagala elucidated that a duty of care may exist outside of a
180
special relationship. However, Domagala also had the effect of
181
further complicating the element of foreseeability in Minnesota.
As Professor Mike Steenson noted, a close reading of Domagala
reveals that the court presented two different foreseeability
182
standards. On the one hand, the court stated that the test for
foreseeability is the test outlined in Whiteford: “[W]hether it was
objectively reasonable to expect the specific danger causing the
183
plaintiff’s injury.” On the other hand, only a few lines later, the
court stated that the test for foreseeability “is not whether the
precise nature and manner of the plaintiff’s injury was foreseeable,

175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Doe 169 I, No. A12-1721, 2013 WL 2302023, at *8 (Minn. Ct. App. May 28,
2013), rev’d, 845 N.W.2d 174 (Minn. 2014).
178. Doe 169 II, 845 N.W.2d at 179.
179. See Mike Steenson, The Domagala Dilemma—Domagala v. Rolland, 39 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 633, 663 (2013).
180. See supra Part III.B.2.
181. See Steenson, supra note 179.
182. Id. at 651.
183. Domagala v. Rolland, 805 N.W.2d 14, 27 (Minn. 2011) (citing Whiteford
ex rel. Whiteford v. Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A., 582 N.W.2d 916, 918 (Minn.
1998)).
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but whether ‘the possibility of an accident was clear to the person
184
of ordinary prudence.’”
E.

Domagala and Doe 169: The Domagala Variance Remains
Unaddressed

Domagala factored heavily in the Minnesota Court of Appeals’
185
analysis of Doe 169’s negligence claim. Notably, in its discussion
of the foreseeability of Doe 169’s injury, the court of appeals cited
186
the more lenient test presented in Domagala. Under this analysis,
the court found that the foreseeability of Doe 169’s injury was a
187
proper question for a jury. The court further discussed the
District Council’s knowledge, via Hickle, of Brandon’s “history of
188
Although
inappropriate relationships with young boys.”
acknowledging that there were no precise incidents of sexual
misconduct, the court noted that the generally known fact that
sexual abuse by church authority figures “occurred and was a
189
problem.”
The court reasoned that this general knowledge,
combined with Hickle’s insight, provided “sufficient evidence to
create questions for the jury” as to whether Doe 169’s injury was
190
reasonably foreseeable.
Despite the court of appeal’s considerable reliance on
Domagala, the supreme court appeared to overlook the fact that, in
191
Domagala, “the duty formulations vary.”
The supreme court
acknowledged the Domagala exception, but then adopted a
foreseeability standard without expressly recognizing or addressing
the duty formulation variance and the “precise nature and
192
manner” caveat of Domagala. In so doing, the supreme court
193
avoided the issue of Domagala’s incongruence.
184. Id. (quoting Connolly v. Nicollet Hotel, 254 Minn. 373, 382, 95 N.W.2d
657, 664 (1959)).
185. See Doe 169 I, No. A12-1721, 2013 WL 2302023, at *5–8 (Minn. Ct. App.
May 28, 2013), rev’d, 845 N.W.2d 174 (Minn. 2014).
186. Id. at *7 (stating that the test utilized by the court of appeals did not
require that the “precise nature and manner” of Doe 169’s injury be foreseeable).
187. Id. at *8 (“Viewing this evidence in a light most favorable to appellant,
whether Brandon’s sexual abuse of appellant was a foreseeable harm is an issue for
the jury.”).
188. Id. at *17.
189. Id. at *21.
190. Id. at *7–8.
191. Steenson, supra note 179, at 651.
192. Doe 169 II, 845 N.W.2d 174, 178 (Minn. 2014) (“[W]e ‘look at whether
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Due to the supreme court’s failure to address and clarify the
Domagala variance, it remains applicable law. This is a troubling
prospect. As Professor Steenson noted, the two differing standards
presented by the Domagala decision may very well be outcome
194
determinative. As the highest court in the state, the supreme
court’s decisions “contribute importantly to public policy
195
nationwide,” public policy that is “directly relevant to the lives of
196
most citizens.” “Adherence to past rulings gives predictability and
197
continuity to the law.” Allowing Domagala to stand, unaddressed,
does exactly the opposite and allows for “the dangerous possibility
that judges will decide cases on a momentary whim or with an
198
individualistic sense of right and wrong.”
Doe 169 incorporates the very essence of the problem that the
dual standards of the Domagala variance presents. The less stringent
foreseeability threshold is met if a reasonable person might have
foreseen the possibility of an accident, even if not the exact
accident that occurred; the steeper threshold is met if a reasonable
person could have foreseen the exact injury that did occur. The
former threshold leaves the door wide open for negligence
litigation. The term “possible accident” is so vague as to invite
almost any adverse event as the basis for a case. In addition, in cases
involving serious injury, foreseeability could be found, even if only
minor injury could have been foreseen. Minnesota negligence law
could benefit from stricter, more clearly defined limits. The latter
Domagala threshold provides exactly that.

the specific danger was objectively reasonable to expect . . . .’” (citing Whiteford ex
rel. Whiteford v. Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A., 582 N.W.2d 916, 918 (Minn.
1998))).
193. See id. at 179 (noting that, though the court “applies the framework of
Domagala,” it does not address the two test formulations present in Domagala).
194. Steenson, supra note 179, at 653–54.
195. Henry R. Glick, Policy Making and State Supreme Courts, in THE AMERICAN
COURTS: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 115 (John B. Gates & Charles A. Johnson eds.,
1991).
196. Id. at 87.
197. ROBERT A. CARP & RONALD STIDHAM, JUDICIAL PROCESS IN AMERICA
286 (5th ed. 2001).
198. Id.
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VII. FORESEEABILITY QUESTIONS LEFT UNANSWERED
Like this dual foreseeability standard, the foreseeability factors
listed by the appellate court—Hickle’s knowledge of Brandon’s
199
past inappropriate behavior; the existence of, to borrow a term
200
201
from a previous Minnesota Court of Appeals case, “red flags;”
and Hickle’s general knowledge that sexual abuse by religious
202
authority figures was a commonly known hazard —were ignored
203
by the supreme court. The Minnesota Supreme Court failed to
address these factors entirely, which was a curious choice. For
204
better or worse, state case law appears to support the court of
appeal’s decision.
A.

Knowledge of Inappropriate Behavior

First, the Minnesota Court of Appeals considered the fact that
the District Council, through Hickle, had knowledge of “Brandon’s
inappropriate boundaries and conduct with male youths while

199. Doe 169 I, No. A12-1721, 2013 WL 2302023, at *8 (Minn. Ct. App. May 28,
2013) (“Through Hickle, respondent knew about Brandon’s history of . . .
maintaining inappropriate relationships, and boundary issues with young boys.
Respondent knew that . . . Brandon gave one youth leg and back rubs.”), rev’d, 845
N.W.2d 174 (Minn. 2014).
200. C.B. ex rel. L.B. v. Evangelical Lutheran Church in Am., 726 N.W.2d 127,
136 (Minn. Ct. App. 2007).
201. See Doe 169 I, 2013 WL 2302023, at *8 (“Respondent knew that Brandon
continued to host sleepovers with male youths even after Hickle directed him to
stop [and] that two youths complained that they felt uncomfortable when
Brandon insisted that they sleep in his bed with him . . . .”).
202. Id. (“Hickle acknowledged that by the late 1980’s ‘it was widely known’
that sexual abuse of children by ministers and youth workers occurred and was a
problem. Hickle wrote an article about the prevention of sexual abuse of children
in the ministry context that was published in a newsletter available to churches
and ministers affiliated with respondent. Slagg testified that sex abuse is a wellknown hazard of ministering to children.”).
203. See supra Part V.A for a discussion of those factors considered decisive by
the Minnesota Supreme Court in reaching the Doe 169 conclusion.
204. The policy implications of the Minnesota Court of Appeals’ decision
were troubling to many. See e.g. Brief and Appendix of Amicus Curiae Minnesota
Religious Council at 10, Doe 169 II, 845 N.W.2d 174 (No. A12-1721), 2013 WL
8481219, at *10 (“[A]ll that [was] necessary to impose a duty on a defendant to
protect a third party from injury is the defendant’s ‘certification’ (or some similar
act) regarding the tortfeasor and a general societal knowledge that people in the
tortfeasor’s position may cause injury to others.”).
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Brandon was employed” under Hickle’s supervision. Namely,
Hickle was aware that “Brandon gave one youth leg and back
206
rubs.” In the Minnesota Supreme Court’s 2007 Bjerke v. Johnson
decision, the defendant directly witnessed inappropriate
207
Ultimately, the
interactions between a minor and an adult.
supreme court decided that the issue of whether or not the
defendant should have reasonably foreseen danger, and the events
208
that unfolded, was a question for the jury. Unlike Doe 169 and
the District Council, the Bjerke defendant and victim were in a
209
special relationship.
Nevertheless, the existence of a special
relationship does not obviate the requirement that the injury in
210
question be foreseeable. The supreme court found that the
“inappropriate behavior” demonstrated by the adult male should
have alerted the Bjerke defendant to the likelihood of imminent
211
sexual abuse. The Minnesota Supreme Court failed to address
what makes the inappropriate behavior in Bjerke different from the
inappropriate behavior in Doe 169.
B.

The Existence of Red Flags

Second, the Minnesota Court of Appeals has suggested that
“red flags” may provide sufficient grounds to establish
foreseeability. For example, in C.B. ex rel. L.B. v. Evangelical
Lutheran Church in America, a retired minister sexually molested the
212
child of a former parishioner. The court of appeals held that the
particular “red flags” presented by the plaintiff—the child’s
overnight visits at the abuser’s house, the abuser’s habit of buying
the child expensive gifts, and the child’s hesitation to visit the
213
abuser—were insufficient to render the sexual abuse foreseeable.
205. Doe 169 I, 2013 WL 2302023, at *7.
206. Id. at *8.
207. 742 N.W.2d 660, 668 (Minn. 2007).
208. Id. at 669.
209. Compare id. at 667, with Doe 169 II, 845 N.W.2d 174, 178 (Minn. 2014).
210. Bjerke, 742 N.W.2d at 667 (“Even where a special relationship exists, a
duty is only imposed if the resulting injury was foreseeable.”).
211. Id. at 668 (“[Q]uestions of material fact exist as to the foreseeability of
any sexual abuse that occurred . . . . The evidence shows that [defendant] Johnson
. . . observed unusual and intimate behavior between [the third party] and [the
injured party] . . . .”).
212. 726 N.W.2d 127, 131–32 (Minn. Ct. App. 2007).
213. Id. at 136 (“Even if respondents were aware of the alleged ‘red flags,’
appellants fail to establish how these ‘red flags’ should have put respondents on
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The court stated that as these behaviors were not “abnormal,” and
214
they did not render the abuse “objectively foreseeable.” This
seems to suggest, then, that the existence of abnormal behaviors,
like those behaviors observed on the part of Brandon, can render
215
abuse foreseeable. The supreme court, however, did not consider
216
this issue in its foreseeability discussion.
C.

The Existence of General Knowledge

Third, the Minnesota Court of Appeals found that the
foreseeability of Doe 169’s injury was a question for the jury, as
Hickle acknowledged that “‘it was widely known’ that sexual abuse
of children by ministers and youth workers occurred and was a
217
problem.” Knowledge that a specific hazard commonly poses a
risk in a particular field has, in previous decisions, rendered the
218
realization of that hazard a foreseeable event.
For example, in Fahrendorff ex rel. Fahrendorff v. North Homes,
Inc., the Minnesota Supreme Court found that an employer, a
group home, was responsible for the sexual abuse of a minor219
resident by an employee.
The supreme court deemed the
foreseeability of the employee’s abuse a question for a jury, as
“inappropriate sexual contact . . . in [group homes] . . . is a well
220
known hazard.”
Likewise, in Marston v. Minneapolis Clinic of
Psychiatry and Neurology, Ltd., the supreme court found that a clinic

notice of the abuse.”).
214. Id.
215. Doe 169 I, No. A12-1721, 2013 WL 2302023, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. May 28,
2013), rev’d, 845 N.W.2d 174 (Minn. 2014).
216. See Doe 169 II, 845 N.W.2d at 179 for the Minnesota Supreme Court’s
analysis of the foreseeability element. The court does not address Brandon’s
inappropriate past actions.
217. Doe 169 I, 2013 WL 2302023, at *8.
218. Fahrendorff ex rel. Fahrendorff v. N. Homes, Inc., 597 N.W.2d 905, 911–
12 (Minn. 1999) (“[Plaintiff] submitted the affidavit from . . . a purported expert
in the group home industry, expressly stating that ‘inappropriate sexual contact or
abuse of power in [group home] situations, although infrequent, is a well known
hazard in this field.’ This sworn statement, although somewhat conclusory and
lacking specific examples, is nearly identical to the testimony we relied on
in Marston in holding that a question of material fact existed on the issue of
foreseeability.” (citing Marston v. Minneapolis Clinic of Psychiatry & Neurology,
Ltd., 329 N.W.2d 306, 311 (Minn. 1982))).
219. 597 N.W.2d 905, 911.
220. Id.
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was responsible for an employee-physician’s forbidden sexual
221
Once again, as “sexual relations
relationships with clients.
222
between a psychologist and a patient is a well-known hazard,” the
Minnesota Supreme Court found that the foreseeability of the
223
doctor’s sexual misconduct posed a question of material fact. The
occurrence of sexual abuse within the church is also, unfortunately,
224
an all too common occurrence. In light of widespread knowledge
that such abuse occurs, as well as valid Minnesota case law
supporting the idea that widespread knowledge may serve as a basis
for foreseeability, the Minnesota Supreme Court should have
addressed why this general knowledge did not render Doe 169’s
injury reasonably foreseeable.
VIII. SUMMARY JUDGMENT IMPLICATIONS
A.

The Drastic Nature of Summary Judgment

Despite the existence of unanswered questions and the
underlying presence of seemingly contradictory case law, the
Minnesota Supreme Court, rather than remand Doe 169 to the
225
lower courts for further examination, reinstated the “drastic” and
226
227
“extreme”
legal remedy of summary judgment.
Summary
judgment results in the serious consequence of removing a case
228
from the hands of a jury. The right to trial by jury, a right
221. 329 N.W.2d 306, 311.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. See, e.g., Julie Bosman, Settlement in Lawsuit Over Priest Abuse Is Revealed,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2014, at us, available at 2014 WLNR 28538070 (discussing “new
procedures to help protect children from sexual abuse by the clergy . . . .”); Bruce
Lambert, Lawsuit Goes to Trial Against the Long Island Diocese Over Sexual Abuse of
Teenagers, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2007, at B, available at 2007 WLNR 7180899
(discussing the “thousands of complaints of sexual abuse involving the Catholic
Church in the United States in recent years”); Sam Frizell, Papal Commission Wants
Priests Held to Account, TIME (May 3, 2014), http://time.com/86762/pope-francis
-catholic-church-commission-abuse/ (discussing the “sexual abuse crisis in the
Catholic Church”).
225. Preach v. Monter Rainbow, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 320, 325 (Ct. App. 1993).
226. Barry v. City of New York, 933 F. Supp. 2d 416, 429 (E.D.N.Y. 2013).
227. Doe 169 II, 845 N.W.2d 174, 179 (Minn. 2014).
228. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155 (1968) (“The guarantees of
jury trial . . . reflect a profound judgment about the way in which law should be
enforced and justice administered.”); Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to
Judgment: Are the “Litigation Explosion,” “Liability Crisis,” and Efficiency Clichés Eroding
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229

expressly guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution, is “venerate[d] . . .
as an institution that links the state with both political and civil
230
society and helps to make democratic society a reality.”
231
Therefore, a summary judgment motion should be granted only
when “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact” and a “party
232
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”
The Minnesota Supreme Court has warned that the “blunt
instrument” of summary judgment “should be employed only
233
where it is perfectly clear that no issue of fact is involved.”
Minnesota has admonished that summary judgment should be
234
and applied “only where it is clearly
wielded with caution

Our Day in Court and Jury Trial Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 982, 1077 (2003)
(“Jury trial is both unique and central to the American legal system.”).
229. U.S. CONST. art. VII.
230. JOHN GASTILL ET AL., THE JURY AND DEMOCRACY: HOW JURY DELIBERATION
PROMOTES CIVIC ENGAGEMENT AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 192 (2010); see Vikram
David Amar, Jury Service as Political Participation Akin to Voting, 80 CORNELL L. REV.
203, 206 (1995) (“[T]he link between jury service and other rights of political
participation such as voting is an important part of our overall constitutional
structure . . . .” (citing Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 407 (1991))).
231. The drastic nature of summary judgment has made it a controversial
legal remedy. Some scholars question whether summary judgment manages to
achieve its goals of economic and judicial efficiency. See John Bronsteen, Against
Summary Judgment, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 522, 547 (2006) (“Summary judgment
costs more than it saves, both in terms of money and fairness.”); D. Theodore
Rave, Note, Questioning the Efficiency of Summary Judgment, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 875, 909
(2006) (concluding that, while not enough empirical data exists to reach a
concrete conclusion, “serious questions” exist as to whether summary judgment is
“a cost-saving device”). Some scholars critique summary judgment as a wholly
unconstitutional legal remedy that should never be granted. See Suja A. Thomas,
Why Summary Judgment Is Still Unconstitutional: A Reply to Professors Brunet and Nelson,
93 IOWA L. REV. 1667 (2008); Suja A. Thomas, Why Summary Judgment Is
Unconstitutional, 93 VA. L. REV. 139 (2007). But see Edward Brunet, Six Summary
Judgment Safeguards, 43 AKRON L. REV. 1165, 1167 (2010) (arguing that “the
summary judgment process facilitates the identification of the issues in litigation,”
and “focus[es] the parties’ attention on the quality of the facts and law”).
Furthermore, Brunet contends that “safeguards”—including “(1) the inherent and
discretionary ability [of the trial court] to find one issue of disputed fact, (2)
robust de novo review, and (3) the Rule 56(f) request for a time-out of pending
discovery”—“exist [to] prevent erroneous grants of summary judgment.” Id. at
1188.
232. MINN. R. CIV. P. 56.03.
233. Donnay v. Boulware, 275 Minn. 37, 45, 144 N.W.2d 711, 716 (1966).
234. Lundgren v. Eusterman, 370 N.W.2d 877, 882 (Minn. 1985) (noting that
though each individual case presents a unique situation, “summary judgments are
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235

applicable.”
Granting a summary judgment motion is only
appropriate when “there is then no legally legitimate fact conflict
236
for the jury to resolve or fact inference for the jury to draw.”
Applying the summary judgment remedy in ambiguous situations,
237
Minnesota’s courts have held, is “wholly erroneous.”
B.

Summary Judgment in Negligence Actions

Summary judgment motions are rarely granted in negligence
238
actions. Questions of negligence require close examination of
circumstances and deliberation as to what is reasonable, ordinary,
or prudent. As such, these questions are “uniquely suited for jury
consideration,” and “are usually inappropriate for summary
239
judgment.” Deciding that an individual acted unreasonably, that
an injury was foreseeable, or that harm resulted directly from an
actor’s own conduct are often matters of discretion. This is not to
say that summary judgment is always inappropriate in a negligence
240
241
claim; such a motion may be granted “in the clearest of cases,”
to be granted with caution”); see also Couillard v. Charles T. Miller Hosp., Inc., 253
Minn. 418, 418, 92 N.W.2d 96, 97 (1958).
235. Katzner v. Kelleher, 535 N.W.2d 825, 828 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995).
236. Jeffrey W. Stempel, A Distorted Mirror: The Supreme Court’s Shimmering View
of Summary Judgment, Directed Verdict, and the Adjudication Process, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 95,
164 (1988) (discussing summary judgment at the federal level).
237. See Illinois Farmers Ins. Co. v. Tapemark Co., 273 N.W.2d 630, 638
(Minn. 1978) (“[P]laintiff should be permitted to offer evidence tending to
establish that young persons . . . were present on the day of the accident and that
the parking lot was known to be a location for incidents of theft . . . and
vandalism.”); Sauter v. Sauter, 244 Minn. 482, 485–86, 70 N.W.2d 351, 353 (1955)
(holding that summary judgment is inappropriate where poor weather conditions
create questions of material fact pertaining to a driver’s ability to avoid an
automobile accident); Abo El Ela v. State, 468 N.W.2d 580, 582–83 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1991) (holding that “standards of reasonableness and causation” pertaining
to a state trooper’s purported negligence are appropriately decided by a jury).
238. 10A CHARLES ALLEN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 2729 (3d ed. 1998).
239. Abo El Ela, 468 N.W.2d at 582–83.
240. See Pond Hollow Homeowners Ass’n v. The Ryland Grp., Inc., 779
N.W.2d 920, 923–24 (Minn. 2010) (upholding summary judgment against plaintiff
when plaintiff failed to establish a professional standard of care); Fabio v. Bellomo,
504 N.W.2d 758, 763 (Minn. 1993) (upholding summary judgment in case of
purported negligent aggravation of a preexisting medical condition); Kaczor v.
Murrow, 354 N.W.2d 524, 526 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (affirming summary
judgment for motorist who had no duty to warn other motorists of a dangerous
driving situation).
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in which “the material facts are undisputed and as a matter of law
242
compel only one conclusion.” In such cases, summary judgment
does not violate the seventh amendment right to a jury trial, as the
lack of material evidence would leave a reasonable jury with “no
243
acceptable task.”
C.

Summary Judgment in Doe 169

With the Minnesota Supreme Court’s reasoning in Doe 169,
summary judgment was an inappropriately strong judicial remedy.
In Doe 169, the supreme court acknowledged that “[o]ur case law
states, without explaining, that in close cases, foreseeability as it
244
relates to duty is a jury question.” The court then declared that
“[b]ecause [Doe 169] does not present a close question on
245
foreseeability, we decide the question as a matter of law.” Case
law suggests the contrary. Questions of material fact, at least as to
the foreseeability of Doe 169’s injury, certainly existed. It is
undisputed that Hickle, a member of the District Council, knew
about Brandon’s history of inappropriate interactions with
246
minors. In addition, the District Council certainly knew that
sexual abuse of minors by church ministers was a reality and a true
247
problem within the church. Hickle’s first-hand knowledge, along
with the District Council’s general knowledge, created questions of
fact as to foreseeability. Therefore, the case should have gone
before a jury and not disposed of through summary judgment.
IX. CONCLUSION
Foreseeability and the misfeasance/nonfeasance distinction
play complex and often misunderstood roles in Minnesota tort law.
Both elements are critically important to questions of negligence;
however, both elements also are potentially perplexing and garner
significant criticism for the often unstable manner in which they

241. Teas v. Minneapolis St. Ry. Co., 244 Minn. 427, 434, 70 N.W.2d 358, 363
(1955).
242. Sauter, 244 Minn. at 486, 70 N.W.2d at 354.
243. Stempel, supra note 236, at 164.
244. Doe 169 II, 845 N.W.2d 174, 178 n.2 (Minn. 2014).
245. Id.
246. Doe 169 I, No. A12-1721, 2013 WL 2302023, at *9 (Minn. Ct. App. May 28,
2013), rev’d, 845 N.W.2d 174.
247. Id. at *8.
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are applied. Foreseeability lacks a clear and standard definition.
What exactly makes an event, victim, or injury foreseeable is largely
248
discretionary.
Meanwhile,
the
misfeasance/nonfeasance
distinction has been described as little more than “semantic play,”
and applying this differentiation to real world scenarios at times
249
proves “impossible.”
In an attempt to inject precision into the murky realms of
foreseeability and misfeasance, states carve out standards through
250
case law, statutes, and policy decisions. However, despite the
gravity of foreseeability and the misfeasance/nonfeasance
distinction, and the bewilderment with which they are often
approached, Doe 169 presents no clarifications. The Minnesota
Supreme Court’s blurred analysis is problematic, beyond simply
serving as a showcase of the court’s disorientation with the
251
Domagala exception. The court reinstated summary judgment for
the defendant in Doe 169, signifying that no other conclusion could
252
be reached. A decision based on foreseeability, however, calls to
mind numerous Minnesota Supreme Court decisions in which
similar facts were considered sufficient to render injury reasonably
253
foreseeable to necessitate jury consideration. Furthermore, the
court’s decision confounds, rather than clarifies, the precarious
spot that the elements of foreseeability and misfeasance occupy in
Minnesota case law. In fact, the court’s decision, though heavily
reliant upon the Domagala opinion, overlooks the fact that
254
Domagala itself presents a perplexing dual foreseeability standard.
In its Doe 169 ruling, the Minnesota Supreme Court had the
opportunity to specify that foreseeability exists only when specific
injury could be reasonably predicted. In so doing, it could have—
and should have—eliminated much of the subjective ambiguity
present in negligence litigation and created a set standard by which
Minnesota courts could abide.
248. See generally William H. Hardie, Jr., Foreseeability: A Murky Crystal Ball for
Predicting Liability, 23 CUMB. L. REV. 349, 397–98 (1993) (“[N]o one can state a
clear and unequivocal definition of ‘foreseeability.’”).
249. Adler, supra note 26, at 877.
250. See Cardi, supra note 160, at 1878. (“[W]here duty is not controlled by
statute or specific common-law rule . . . duty almost universally is articulated as a
multi-factorial policy decision.”).
251. See Doe 169 II, 845 N.W.2d at 178.
252. Id. at 179.
253. See supra Part VII.
254. See supra Part VI.E.
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